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Zablotsky: Appropriate Role of Plaintiff Misuse

THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF PLAINTIFF
MISUSE IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CAUSES OF
ACTION
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Thank you, Professor Phillips. Our last scheduled speaker,
before we throw things open for wild discussion, is Professor
Peter Zablotsky.
ProfessorPeterZablotsky*:
Perhaps the most significant issue raised in connection with
section 402A is whether two of the three major products liability
causes of action, those for defective design and failure to warn,
should lie in strict liability or in negligence (fault). This issue of
fault-based liability versus strict liability1 is often at the forefront
2
of the discussion of the revision of section 402A.

* Associate Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law
Center. B.A., Pennsylvania State University, 1977; J.D., Columbia University
School of Law, 1980.
Professor Zablotsky would like to thank Annie Haskins Weinstein and the
members of the Touro Law Review for their assistance with research for this
article.
1. See, e.g., RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LiABILrTY LAW
103-04 (1980) (discussing the "recurrent tension between negligence and strict
liability theories" in causes of action for inadequate warning and design
defects); David A. Fischer, Role of Misuse in Products Liability Litigation, 17
LAW NOTES, Spring 1981, at 49, 50-51 (analyzing design defects under strict
liability and failure to warn with respect to manufacturers' conduct); James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A ProposedRevision of Section 402,4 of
the Restatement (Second)of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512, 1515-17, 153032 (1992) (taking no "explicit position" on "whether design and warning
defects are governed by strict liability" but suggesting that "some sort of riskutility test" which may be "synonymous with a negligence standard" should be
applied in actions for design and warning defects); Knox D. Nunnally & B.
Lee Ware, Defenses in PersonalInjury ProductLiability Cases: Assumption of
Risk and Misuse with a View Towards Comparative Fault, 20 S.TEX. L.J.
221, 229-31 (1980) (attaching failure to warn cases to strict liability);
Christopher H. Toll, The Burden of Proving Misuse in Products Liability
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The position of prominence assumed by this issue is well
earned. From one perspective, the majority of other issues that
have engendered discussion regarding the revision of section
402A flow from this issue. For example, on the issue of the
continuing utility of the consumer expectation test, there seems to
be universal agreement that the test is appropriately applied in the
context of a manufacturing defect cause of action, which is
almost without exception thought to be fairly grounded in strict
liability. 3 It is only in the context of the issue of whether design

defect and failure to warn liability should be with or without fault
that the utility of the consumer expectation test is called into
question. 4 Similarly, the significance and nature of the risk-utility
test changes in accordance with whether it is applied to the
product or the manufacturer's conduct, a distinction traditionally
used to define the difference between strict liability and faultbased liability. 5 And perhaps the most obvious issue is whether
Cases, 20 COLO. LAW. 2307, 2307 (1991) (noting that "strict liability focuses
on the product rather than on the manufacturer's conduct," unlike in
negligence); Knowing Misuse Defense in Product Liability Cases, 31 BOSTON
B.J., May-June 1987, at 16, 17 (stating that "negligence and strict liability are
separate concepts").
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). This provision
provides in relevant part:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relationship with the seller.
Id.
3. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1516.
4. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1515-17, 1532-34.
5. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1544-45.
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the question of when to apply the appropriate test, at the time of
6
manufacture or time of trial, turns on the theory of fault.
With the hope of ultimately relating the discussion to the
preeminent issue of the appropriate theory of liability, this article
addresses two discrete sub-issues raised by the revision of section
402A: (1) the burden of proof regarding plaintiff misuse; and (2)
the treatment of misuse in a comparative fault-based analytical
framework for products liability actions. This article concludes
that misuse is most appropriately treated as an affirmative
defense, and that such treatment is generally most compatible
with the appropriate role of negligence in this products liability
context and the ascendancy of comparative fault in tort law.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF REGARDING PLAINTIFF
MISUSE
Turning first to the burden of proof regarding plaintiff misuse,
by way of background, plaintiff conduct has always been relevant
to the cause of action for products liability. 7 Although not
6. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1544-45.

7. See Dooms v. Stewart Boiling & Co., 241 N.W.2d 738, 744 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1976) ("If the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury is found to
have stemmed from his own conduct, such as misuse of a product... he may
not recover .... " (citing Casey v. Gifford Wood Co., 232 N.W.2d 360
(Mich. Ct. App. 1975))); see also Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 890 F.2d

1540, 1544 (10th Cir. 1989) (affirming court's denial of judgment
notwithstanding the verdict where there was sufficient evidence at trial to

determine that plaintiff's conduct was "objectively reasonable to expect"),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993); O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc.,

821 F.2d 1438, 1443 (10th Cir. 1987) (stating that product liability defenses
such as assumption of the risk and product misuse all "depend on the

reasonableness of plaintiff's conduct...." (quoting Prince v. Leesona Corp.,
720 F.2d 1166, 1171) (10th Cir. 1983) (citing Kennedy v. City of Sawyer,
618 P.2d 788, 796-97 (1980))), cert. denied sub nom. Playtex Holdings, Inc.
v. O'Gilvie, 486 U.S. 1032 (1988); Schwartz v. American Honda Motor Co.,
710 F.2d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding issue of misuse properly submitted
to jury where plaintiff presented no evidence that his improper conduct was
reasonably foreseeable); Mitchell v. Fruehauf Corp., 568 F.2d 1139, 1146
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specifically addressing misuse, comment n to section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) states that contributory negligence (i.e., the
failure to discover a defect in a product) is not a defense in a
products liability action, while assumption of risk (i.e.,
continuing to make use of a product after having discovered its
defect and becoming aware of its danger) is a defense. 8 On a
related point, the text of the Restatement (Second) limits seller
liability to those products that reach consumers "without
substantial change," 9 and elaborates on this point in comment

g. 10 Over the past thirty years, the issues of misuse and
substantial change have been discussed extensively by
commentators 11 and judges, 12 and ultimately categorized under
(5th Cir. 1978) (affirming court's decision not to give jury instructions on
product misuse where plaintiffs conduct was held to be improper but not
unforeseeable); Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 498 F. Supp. 389, 393 (D.
Mont. 1980) (denying plaintiffs request for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict where the court gave jury instructions on both comparative fault
principles and assumption of the risk as "it was only plaintiffs conduct falling
short of assumption of risk which could be considered in applying the
comparative fault principles.. . ."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983). But
see Dillinger v. Caterpillar, Inc., 959 F.2d 430, 440-42 (3d Cir. 1992)
(rejecting the admission of plaintiffs conduct to rebut the "causation" prong
of defendant's claim as such conduct was not the cause of the accident).
8.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A cmt. n (1965). Comment n

states in pertinent part:
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such
negligence consists merely of a failure to discover the defect in the
product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other
hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntary
and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and
commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense
under this section as in other cases of strict liability.
Id.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(l)(b) (1965) provides, "it
is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold." Id.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965) states in
pertinent part: "The seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a safe
condition, and subsequent mishandling or other causes make it harmful by the
time it is consumed." Id.
11. See, e.g., John F. Vargo, The Defenses to Strict Liability in Tort: A
New Vocabulary With an Old Meaning, 29 MERCER L. REv. 447, 455-59
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the headings of alteration, modification, and,13most importantly
for purposes of the present discussion, misuse.
Through the course of analysis of misuse, a further issue has
emerged regarding the burden of proof. Specifically, the courts
are split on the question of whether misuse is an affirmative
defense to be established by the defendant, or part of the prima
14
facie case to be established by the plaintiff.
(1978) (tracing the origins of the defenses of misuse, abnormal use, and
unintended use).
12. See, e.g., Kelly v. M. Trigg Enters., Inc., 605 So. 2d 1185, 1192-93
(Ala. 1992) (holding that when asserting misuse as a defense defendant must
show that plaintiff used the product in an unforeseeable manner); Milwaukee
Elec. Tool Corp. v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 24, 32 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1993) (noting substantial change as one of the factors to be
considered under strict liability when misuse by injured plaintiff is
foreseeable); Elliot v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 621 A.2d 1371, 1373-76
(Conn. App. Ct. 1993) (stating that unforeseeable misuse defense has been
incorporated into product alteration/modification defense); Gregory v. White
Truck & Equip. Co., 323 N.E.2d 280, 287-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (affirming
that misuse is a defense in a strict liability action); Ellsworth v. Sherne
Lingerie, Inc. 495 A.2d 348, 352-57 (Md. 1985) (concluding that carelessness
or inattention can constitute contributory negligence without being considered

misuse).
13. See, e.g., Elliot, 621 A.2d at 1374 (defining alteration and
modification for the purposes of determining whether the court properly
instructed the jury on the defense of misuse); see also Henderson & Twerski,
supra note 1, at 1545-46 (categorizing misuse, modification, and alteration as
"forms of user and third-party conduct").
14. See Ellsworth, 495 A.2d at 354-55; Toll, supra note 1, at 2308-11;
see also Marchese v. Warner Communications, Inc, 670 P.2d 113, 116 (N.M.
1983) (stating that "[diefendants have the burden of proving [their] affirmative
defenses..." and that misuse is one of those "defenses previously allowed to
be raised in [that] jurisdiction . ... "); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521
P.2d 1353, 1366 (Okla. 1974) (suggesting that misuse may "as a matter of
proof be an affirmative matter.... ."); Jackson v. Standard Oil Co., 505 P.2d
139, 149 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that misuse is an affirmative defense
and the burden falls on defendant). But see Schwartz v. American Honda
Motor Co., 710 F.2d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that "[the] absence of
misuse is part of plaintiff's proof of an unreasonably dangerous condition or of
proximate cause.... ."); Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542, 548
(Iowa 1980) (holding that "misuse is not to be treated injury instructions as an
affirmative defense..." but rather the "burden of proof [is] on [the
plaintiff] .... ."); Rogers v. Toro Mfg. Co., 522 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Mo. Ct.
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The primary argument supporting the position that plaintiff
misuse is part of the plaintiff's prima facie case is as follows:
generally, in products liability cases, "the plaintiff is able to
establish that the product was defective, and the question then
becomes whether the harm was within the risk created by the
defective product" 15 (i.e., whether the misuse was foreseeable
from the point of view of the defendant). Stated in this way, the
issue of misuse is really one of proximate cause. Since proximate
cause is part of the plaintiff's burden of proof, misuse, like
proximate cause, is rightfully part of the plaintiff's burden. 16
The same argument is advanced in the context of cause in fact
by those authorities who look at plaintiff misuse as a superseding
factual cause. 17
In my opinion, there is a significant problem with this
argument. My criticism is as follows: defenses in many cases,
when used successfully, relate to cause in fact or proximate
cause. Otherwise, the defense is likely to be irrelevant evidence
to the damages claimed. 18 Typically, in cases in which defenses
are involved, a plaintiff alleges that certain acts of the defendant
caused his injury, and the defendant counters by denying the
plaintiff's version of events and claiming instead that certain acts
App. 1975) (holding that misuse "is not properly a defense but a necessary
element of plaintiff's cause of action .... ").
15. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1545-46.
16. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1546. See also Ellsworth, 495
A.2d at 356 ("The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to show that the
product was in a defective condition when it left the hands of the seller.").
17. See, e.g., Ellsworth, 495 A.2d at 356 (holding that misuse is not an
affirmative defense because causation is an element of plaintiff's case). But see
Navarro v. George Koch & Sons, Inc., 512 A.2d 507, 515 (N.J. 1986)
(concluding that intervening superseding cause must be proven by defendant
manufacturer in a products liability case).
18. See, e.g., McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co., 391 F.2d 364, 370 (5th Cir.

1968) (holding that misuse is not a defense unless it relates to proximate
cause); Ellsworth, 495 A.2d at 355 ("Misuse of a product may also bar

recovery where the misuse is the sole proximate cause of damage, or where it
is the intervening or superseding cause."); Singer v. Walker, 39 A.D.2d 90,
93, 331 N.Y.S.2d 823, 827 (1st Dep't 1972) ("[A] manufacturer need not
anticipate that his product will be misused."), aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 786, 298
N.E.2d 681, 345 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1973).
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of the plaintiff were the cause. 19 If the foregoing is true, the fact
that plaintiff misuse affects cause in fact or proximate cause
cannot justify placing on the plaintiff the burden of proof
regarding misuse. For if it does, the same principle justifies
placing on the plaintiff the burden of proving every defense that

affects cause in fact or proximate cause, i.e., most defenses.
Clearly, it does not.20
For example, in negligence cases, the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant's negligence caused his injury, and the defendant
claims that the plaintiffs contributory negligence caused the
injury. 2 1 In products liability cases, the plaintiff alleges that the
product caused his injury, and the defendant alleges that
something else, perhaps the plaintiff himself, is the cause of this

injury. 22 Placing the burden on the plaintiff to prove that he did
19. See, e.g., Beacham v. Lee-Norse, 714 F.2d 1010, 1014 (10th Cir.
1983). In Beacham, the plaintiff alleged that the lack of a guard shielding the
pinch point made the product defective while the defendant manufacturer
argued the affirmative defenses of misuse and unreasonable use. Id.; Davidson
v. Stanadyne, Inc., 718 F.2d 1334, 1337 (5th Cir. 1983). In Davidson, the
plaintiff alleged that a faucet was defective and unreasonably dangerous while
defendant manufacturer argued that the plaintiff misused the product. Id.;
Harville v. Anchor-Wate Co., 663 F.2d 598, 602-03 (5th Cir. 1981). In
Harville, a worker who lost an arm argued that a machine was unreasonably
dangerous while the manufacturer argued misuse. Id.; General Motors Corp.
v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Tex. 1977). In Hopkins, the driver of a
capsized pickup truck claimed his injury was caused by the defective design of
the carburetor while the manufacturer claimed the injury was caused by an
alteration of the carburetor.; Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301,
1302 (Utah 1981). In Mulherin, a miner who lost his leg attributed the injury
to the manufacturer defectively designing the throttle control of a winch while
the manufacturer attributed the injury to the miner misusing the winch by
standing on it. Id.
20. See Glen 0. Robinson, Multiple Causationin Tort Lmv: Reflections on
the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REv. 713, 728-36 (1982) (stating that burden of
proof does not rest entirely on the shoulders of the plaintiff and that defendant
carries burden of asserting affirmative defenses to rebut plaintiff's claim).
21. See supranote 19 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Allen v. Chance Mfg. Co., 873 F.2d 465, 466 (1st Cir.
1989). In Allen, plaintiff who was disassembling an amusement ride claimed a
defective pin caused an eye injury while defendant claimed the non-use of
recommended safety glasses caused the injury. Id.; Singleton v. Manitowoc
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not misuse the product is no more justifiable than placing the
burden on the plaintiff that he was not contributorily negligent;
the latter is not the law, 23 and the former should not be either.
Rather, despite the impact of plaintiff misuse on cause in fact
and proximate cause, the bulk of authority that holds that the
burden of proof regarding plaintiff misuse falls on the defendant
offers the appropriate analysis. This conclusion is based on: 1)
the meaning and nature of the concept of misuse as it is applied
in the products liability context; 2) the way analogous conflicts
are resolved in other areas of civil and criminal law; and 3) the
necessary perspective that must be kept on the role of negligence
in the strict products liability area.
Regarding the meaning of misuse, it becomes immediately
clear that, over the decades, the courts have adopted a variety of
definitions for this concept. The defenses range from the simple,
e.g., "use is not reasonably foreseeable," 24 to the intricate, and
even awkward, e.g., "a use of a product where it is handled in a
way which the manufacturer could not have reasonably foreseen
or expected in the normal and intended use of the product and the
plaintiff could foresee an injury as the result of the unintended
use;" 25 and again, "a use or handling so unusual that the average
consumer could not reasonably expect the product to be designed
and manufactured to withstand it -- a use which the seller,

Inc., 727 F. Supp. 217, 218 (D.C. Md. 1990). In Singleton, plaintiff alleged
that his hand was crushed between a crane and a tool box due to the absence of
mirrors while the crane manufacturer alleged that the injury was caused by the
addition of the tool box to the crane. id.
23. See, e.g., Jackson v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 896 F.2d 915, 917 (5th Cir.
1990) (stating that the defendant has the burden of proving contributory
negligence); Coleman v. Parkline Corp., 844 F.2d 863, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(finding that contributory negligence was an affirmative defense and defendant
had the burden of proof); Ozzello v. Peterson Builders, Inc., 743 F. Supp.
1302, 1312 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (holding that the defendant must prove
contributory negligence by a preponderance of the evidence).
24. See Harville v. Anchor-Wate Co., 663 F.2d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 1981);
Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542, 547 (Iowa 1980).
25. Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 527 A.2d 1337, 1341 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App), cert. denied, 533 A.2d 1308 (Md. 1987).
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therefore, need not anticipate and provide for. "26 Regardless of
which definition is adopted, the concept of plaintiff misuse is
broken down into at least two components - plaintiff's conduct
and manufacturer foreseeability of that conduct.
Looking at misuse in this light would seem to mandate that at
least part of the burden of proof regarding plaintiff misuse
analysis must fall on the defendant. Although manufacturer
foreseeability is arguably part of a proximate cause analysis,
establishing what conduct the plaintiff engaged in clearly is not.
Rather, establishing plaintiff conduct as a prelude to proving the
plaintiff's conduct caused the injury seems to me to be the
quintessential burden placed on a defendant seeking to establish
an affirmative defense.
With respect to the way analogous conflicts are resolved in
other areas of law, perhaps one needs to look no further than
contributory negligence. As stated earlier, in negligence cases,
the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's negligence caused his
injury and the defendant claims that the plaintiff's contributory
negligence caused or worsened the injury. 2 7 As part of the prima
facie case, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the
defendant had a duty, that the defendant breached that duty by
engaging in conduct that was unreasonable (i.e., defendant
exposed the plaintiff to a foreseeable risk when available
alternative courses of action would not have), and that the

26. Id.; See also W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEErON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 102, at 710 (5th ed. 1984). According to Prosser:
negligent conduct or misuse of some kind or character of either an
intermediate seller, a claimant, or a third person is, in combination with
a product defect, a producing cause of a damaging event, such as a drug
mishap, traffic accident, airline crash, or a workplace accident. If this
conduct is that of a claimant or chargeable to a claimant then it may
constitute a defense that will either diminish or bar recovery.
Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965). According to
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, it has been argued that reducing the

plaintiff's recovery by the percentage of his fault compromises the policy
decision to encourage manufacturers to produce safer products by not imposing
primary responsibility on the manufacturers for plaintiff's injuries. Id.
27. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's injury. 28 If
the plaintiff meets this burden, the defendant may, by way of

affirmative defense, show that the plaintiff had a duty toward
himself, that the plaintiff breached this duty by engaging in
conduct that was unreasonable, (i.e., plaintiff exposed himself to
a foreseeable risk when available courses of action would not
have), and that the plaintiffs conduct was the cause of his
injury. 29

In this analytical framework, the plaintiff has the burden
regarding the defendant's conduct, the defendant has the burden
regarding the plaintiffs conduct, and both parties have the
burden regarding cause. The same result should follow in

products liability causes of action, to wit: the plaintiff has the
burden of proof regarding the status (i.e., a seller engaged in the
business of selling the product in issue) and certain activities of
28. See, e.g., Mortensen v. Memorial Hosp., 105 A.D.2d 151, 158, 483
N.Y.S.2d 264, 270 (1st Dep't 1984) ("[I]n any negligence action, the plaintiff
has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant's negligence... proximately caused the injury claimed."); Monroe
v. City of New York, 67 A.D.2d 89, 95, 414 N.Y.S.2d 718, 722 (2d Dep't
1979) ("In order to recover on the theory of common-law negligence, it was
incumbent upon plaintiff to establish that defendant owed him a duty of care,
the breach of which caused his injuries."); Winter v. Motel Assocs. of
LaGuardia, 127 Misc. 2d 486, 487, 486 N.Y.S.2d 656, 658 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1985) ("The plaintiff has the burden of proving . . . that the
defendant's conduct was unreasonable.").
29. See Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188, 192 (1st Cir. 1980)
(holding that plaintiff's injuries sustained as a result of throwing a glass beer
bottle against a telephone pole is a misuse of an otherwise fit product for
which manufacturer cannot be held liable); McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co., 391
F.2d 364, 370 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding that plaintiff who was provided with
manufacturer's instructions regarding the proper tire size for his vehicle but
instead purchased an improper size had misused the product); Magnuson v.
Rupp Mfg., Inc., 171 N.W.2d 201, 208 (Minn. 1969) (holding that mechanic
who was aware of a spark plug malfunction was not entitled to recover on
basis of strict liability from the manufacturer because the direct and proximate
cause of the injury was plaintiffs operation of the snowmobile); Procter &
Gamble Mfg. Co., v. Langley, 422 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. Ct. App. 1967)
(denying plaintiff damages for injuries sustained from use of a home
permanent hair wave product because buyer's injury was a result of her failure
to follow instructions).
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the defendant (i.e., not adopting a safer feasible product design,

not warning about known non-obvious product related dangers),
and the defendant has the burden regarding certain activities of

the plaintiff (i.e., his misuse of the product), while both have the
burden regarding cause.

If for no other reason than the desirability of finding some
neutral ground, two other areas may be worthy of consideration.
The first area involves Title VII, 30 i.e., a cause of action for
discrimination in employment, and the defenses available to a
defendant employer. While the resolution of critical issues
affecting Title VII actions has changed over time, often in direct

relationship to the changing composition of the United States
Supreme Court, 3 1 there seems to be general agreement on the

following: to establish a prima facie case, an employee must
show that 1) he is a member of a protected class, and that 2) he
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
31. In the Supreme Court decision of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the
Court held that a job qualification, which required a high school diploma or
passing a generalized intelligence test as a pre-condition for employment or a
promotion, to be violative of Title VII. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Court
stated:
[T]he Act does not command that any person be hired simply because he
was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member
of a minority group. Discriminatory preference for any group, minority
or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. What
is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification.
Id. at 430-31. Four years later, Griggs was reaffirmed in Albermarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). Then, in 1989, with a more conservative
majority on the bench, the Supreme Court restricted the Griggs holding in
Wards Cove Packing Co., v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), and held:
A Title VII plaintiff does not make out a case of disparate impact simply
by showing that, 'at the bottom line,' there is racial imbalance in the
work force. As a general matter, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is
the application of a specific or particular employment practice that has
created the disparate impact under attack.
Id. at 657 (emphasis supplied); see also Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts
and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in 7tle WI
and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 203 n.l (1993).
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was disadvantaged in a term or condition of employment relative
to another employee who is not within the protected class. 32 By
establishing these elements, "the plaintiff in a Title VII action
creates a rebuttable 'presumption that the employer unlawfully
discriminated against' him. To rebut this presumption, the
'defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of
admissible evidence, the reasons for plaintiff's rejection.'" 33
Finally, "once a Title VII plaintiff has made out a prima facie
case and the defendant employer has articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision, the
plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the reason is
pretextual," i.e., that the proffered legitimate reason is not the
real reason for the employment decision. 34
All of this burden shifting relates to cause. In United States
Postal Service Board v. Aikens, 35 the Supreme Court provides
the most direct example of the applicability of these principles in
the context of a causation analysis. In Aikens, a black employee
alleged that he was passed over for promotions for which he was
qualified, and that the promotions went instead to white
employees. 36 In other words, the employee alleged that his race
was the cause of disparate treatment in employment. The
employer claimed that the cause of the employee being so treated
was his refusal to accept lateral transfers. 37 The specific issue
faced by the Court was whether the defendant-employer had the
burden of proving that its proffered legitimate reason was the
cause, or whether the plaintiff-employee had the burden of
proving, as part of his prima facie case, that the legitimate reason
was not the cause. 38 The Court held that negating the defendant32. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713
(1982); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Price
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609, 612 (5th Cir. 1977).
33. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981)).
34. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 717 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
35. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
36. ld. at 713 n.2.
37. Id. at 715.
38. Id. at 714.
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employers reason was not part of the plaintiffs prima facie case,
and that the employee need show "only that he was black, that he
applied for a promotion for which he possessed the minimum
qualifications, and that the employer selected a non-minority
39
applicant" in a way that evinces an intent to discriminate.
In my view, a direct parallel can be drawn between Title VII
actions and products liability actions. That parallel is as follows:
the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case; and
such case does not include misuse as an element but does require
the plaintiff to establish that the product (or design or lack of
warning) was the cause in fact of his injuries. The burden then
shifts to the defendant to offer evidence of plaintiff misuse being
the cause, and it is only then that the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to show that misuse was not the real cause of the
accident. The fact that all of this burden shifting involves the
same issue of causation does not ultimately make it any less
necessary or appropriate in the Title VII area; the same should
hold in products liability as well.
The mens rea component in the criminal area offers a second
analogy. Mens rea, generally, is that component of a criminal
offense that defines the required culpable state of mind. 40 As
with all elements of a criminal offense, the prosecution bears the
41
burden of proof with respect to the culpable state of mind.
Once the prosecution has met this burden, the defendant may

39. ld. at 713.
40. See Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475, 480-81 (1991) (stating
prosecution has burden of proving each element of criminal offense, including
intent, beyond a reasonable doubt); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W.
ScOrr, JR., SuBsrANrVE CmIuINAL LAW § 1.8(b), at n.13 (1986) (mental
fault is an element of all non-strict liability crimes).
41. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) ("[Tihe due
process clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all
of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant
is charged."); LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 40, § 1.8(b), at n.13 (mental
fault is an element in all non-strict liability crimes); see also People v. Kohl,
72 N.Y.2d 191, 193-94, 527 N.E.2d 1182, 1183, 532 N.Y.S.2d 45, 45
(1988) (culpable mental state is an element of the prosecutor's case).
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raise the defense of insanity, 42 or in some jurisdictions, the lack
of capacity. 43 While the insanity and lack of capacity defenses

are varied and subtle in form, they often come down to the same
generic claim that the defendant did not act with the state of mind
necessary to satisfy the culpability requirement. 44
Despite this relationship between insanity, lack of capacity,
mens rea, and the fact that the prosecution bears the burden of
establishing mens rea, virtually all states have statutes providing
that these defenses are affirmative defenses and that the burden of
production is on the defendant (i.e., the defendant must come

42. See LAFAVE & ScoTw, supra note 40, § 4.5(e) ("On the issue of lack
of responsibility because of insanity, the initial burden of going forward is
everywhere placed upon the defendant.").
43. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15 (McKinney 1987). Section 40.15
provides that:
In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that when
the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct, he lacked criminal
responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect. Such lack of
criminal responsibility means that at the time of such conduct, as a
result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to know
or appreciate either:
1. The nature and consequences of such conduct; or
2. That such conduct was wrong.
Id.
44. See Longoria v. State, 168 A.2d 695, 702 (Del.) (stating that a
defendant who was mentally ill lacked the mental capacity to distinguish
between right and wrong with respect to the act), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 10
(1961); State v. Hathaway, 211 A.2d 558, 563 (Me. 1965) (holding defendant
pleading not guilty by reason of insanity must show that he lacked "the mental
capacity to distinguish between right and wrong or know the act was
wrong.... ."); City of Minneapolis v. Altimus, 238 N.W.2d 851, 857 (Minn.
1976) (holding that a defense of involuntary intoxication will relieve a
defendant of criminal responsibility when the intoxication deprives him of the
capacity to know the nature of his act or that it was wrong); State v. Bannister,
339 S.W.2d 281, 282 (Mo. 1960) (stating that the mental test for criminal
responsibility is whether defendant was capable of distinguishing right from
wrong as applied to a particular act); Jones v. Commonwealth, 117 S.E.2d 67,
71 (Va. Ct. App. 1960) (stating that the test of insanity was whether defendant
understood the nature and character of his act and its consequences, and had
knowledge that it was wrong and criminal).
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forward with evidence showing that he is insane). 45 Furthermore,
half of the jurisdictions place the burden of persuasion on the
defendant as well. 46 The United States Supreme Court has
specifically stated that placing the entire burden of proof on the
defendant regarding the insanity defense is constitutional. 47
The defenses of insanity and lack of capacity relate to mens rea
as directly as misuse relates to cause. Yet, the fact that this
burden sharing between the prosecution and the defense involves
the same issue (i.e., state of mind) does not negate the validity,
or for that matter, the constitutionality of the analytical
framework. The same is true of Title VII, and should be true of

products liability.
45. See, e.g., Longoria, 168 A.2d at 704 (holding that defendant was
presumed sane and had the burden of producing evidence to the contrary);
Evans v. State, 140 So. 2d 348, 349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (holding that
defendant was presumed sane and had the burden of establishing evidence that
he was insane); Barker v. State, 4 S.E.2d 31, 33 (Ga. 1939) (holding that
burden of producing evidence of insanity was on defendant); McDonald v.
Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Ky. 1977) (holding that burden of
production for insanity defense was on defendant); State v. Swink, 47 S.E.2d
852, 853 (N.C. 1948) (holding that an accused must prove his insanity to the
satisfaction of the jury); State v. Hinson, 172 S.E.2d 548, 554 (S.C. 1970)
(holding that defendant must provide sufficient proof of insanity to overcome
presumption of sanity); Nilsson v. State, 477 S.W.2d 592, 599 (rex. Crim.
App. 1972) (holding that a defendant who pleads insanity bears the burden of
proof); Jones, 117 S.E.2d at 70 (holding that defendant was presumed sane
and had the burden of producing evidence to the contrary).
46. See, e.g., People v. Bornholdt, 33 N.Y.2d 75, 85, 305 N.E.2d 461,
466, 350 N.Y.S.2d 369, 376 (1973) (holding that placing burden of
persuasion on defendant in criminal case for affirmative defense was
constitutional), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974); Olivier v. State, 850
S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that defendant had burden of
proof and persuasion for affirmative defense of insanity); State v. Box, 745
P.2d 23, 26 (Wash. 1987) (stating that burden of persuasion for insanity
defense was placed on defendant).
47. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799 (1952) (placing burden of
proof on defendant to determine issue of insanity is constitutional); see also
Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877, 877 (1976) (dismissing an appeal in
reliance on Le/and for not raising substantial federal question); c. Paterson,
432 U.S. at 210 (placing burden of proof for affirmative defense of extreme
emotional disturbance on defendant was constitutional).
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To appreciate the danger in placing the burden of showing "no
misuse" on the plaintiff in products liability actions, we must
return to the initial and ultimate issue, i.e., whether products
liability actions are based on fault or lie in strict liability. As
stated previously, it is beyond dispute that a cause of action for
manufacturing defect lies in strict liability. 4 8 The danger is that,
by placing the burden on the plaintiff to establish "no misuse,"
we are placing on the plaintiff the burden of proving that his
conduct was foreseeable or reasonable, and consequently turning
even causes of action for strict liability manufacturing defect into
causes of action for negligence. Regarding causes of action for
design defect and failure to warn, placing the burden of "no
misuse" on the plaintiff is an indirect, but no less effective, way
of grounding these causes of action in negligence. Such a major
theoretical change should not be accomplished indirectly.
I do not believe that I am overestimating the danger that
mishandling the concept of misuse would risk turning every strict
products liability cause of action into one of negligence. This
danger has been recognized by other commentators and addressed
in the case law. 49 One of the most revealing and best examples of
the danger is the case of Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie.50 This is
somewhat paradoxical because Ellsworth is one of the seminal
cases cited by those who, in arguing that products liability should
48. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 726 P.2d 648, 651 (Idaho
1985) ("Courts have had to wrestle with various . . . doctrines and to
recognize 'shadowy distinctions between defenses in products cases and
negligence cases.'") (citations omitted); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665
S.W.2d 414, 424 (Tex. 1984) (recognizing the difficulty courts have in
differentiating between the way defenses are used in products liability cases
and negligence cases); see also Mark E. Roszkowski & Robert A. Prentice,
Reconciling Comparative Negligence and Strict Liability: A Public Policy
Analysis, 33 ST Louis U. L.J. 19, 68 (1989) (discussing how courts' confused
characterization of misuse in strict liability cases has led to the introduction of
comparative negligence principles in products liability actions); David P.
Griffith, Note, Products Liability - Negligence Presumed: An Evolution, 67
TEx. L. REv. 851, 857 (discussing how due care negligence standard has
remained an inherent part of strict products liability doctrine due to
inconsistent definitions and applications of misuse defense).
50. 495 A.2d 348 (Md. 1985).
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be ruled by negligence, would place the burden of "no misuse"
on the plaintiff. 5 1
In Ellsworth, the plaintiff was wearing a flannelette
nightgown. 52 Unfortunately, she was wearing it inside out, with
the result that the two side pockets were flapping and
protruding. 5 3 The plaintiff placed a kettle on the burner of her
stove to make a cup of coffee, and turned the burner on. 54 She
then reached above the stove to get a coffee filter from a
cupboard and, as she was reaching, one of the protruding pockets
came into contact with the burner, and the gown ignited. 55 The
plaintiff was seriously injured, and brought, inter alia, a products
56
liability cause of action.
The defendant argued that the plaintiff's "use" of the
nightgown was to "drape0 it over a hot burner for an appreciable
period of time, [which] cannot seriously be considered a
reasonably foreseeable manner of use," 57 and that misuse of the
nightgown was a question for the jury.5 8 The trial judge agreed,
and accordingly instructed the jury. 5 9 The jury found that the
plaintiff misused the nightgown, and returned a verdict for the
0
defendant. 6
The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that the
plaintiff's use of the nightgown, though careless, did not, as a
matter of law, constitute misuse. 6 1 The court concluded
that,"[m]omentary inattention or carelessness on the part of the
user, while it may constitute contributory negligence, does not
add up to misuse of the product .... "62 This holding shows that
this court was acutely aware that misuse could be used to turn
51. ld. at 356.
52. Id. at 351.

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

57. Id. at 353.

58. Id.
59. Id. at 352.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 356-57.
62. Id. at 357.
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this strict liability cause of action into one for negligence, and
that this shift in liability theory was clearly improper (even in
those jurisdictions that treat "no misuse" as part of the plaintiff's
63
prima facie case).

Although it is not universally agreed that there is danger in
misapplying misuse, it cannot be denied that placing the burden
of showing "no misuse" on the plaintiff has significant
ramifications that can affect the outcome of any particular cause
of action. While this has been demonstrated in a plethora of
cases, 64 it might be useful to examine these ramifications with
reference to some oft-cited hypotheticals. To take one example,
the court in General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins65 stated that the
63. Id. at 356.
64. See, e.g., Young v. Up-Right Scaffolds, Inc., 637 F.2d 810 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); Schmutz v. Bolles, 800 P.2d 1307 (Colo. 1990). In Young,
plaintiff was injured when the scaffolding he was disassembling collapsed. 637
F.2d at 812. The trial judge, in refusing to give a jury instruction indicating
that contributory negligence is not a defense, erred in failing to recognize that
"although contributory negligence is a defense in a negligence action, almost
all courts refuse to recognize it is a defense in a strict liability action . ..."
Id. at 814. The court stated: "Because the plaintiff does not appear to have
been conscious of any danger and because his use of the product may have
been reasonably foreseeable, it is possible that the jury would have considered
him contributorily negligent but not responsible for product misuse. . . ." Id.
at 815. In Schrnutz, plaintiff instituted a medical malpractice action against
defendant doctor, and a products liability action against defendant
manufacturer of a drill, which the doctor used on the plaintiff during surgery,
causing plaintiff to suffer a stroke. 800 P.2d at 1309. Upon the request of the
drill manufacturer, the trial court gave a product misuse instruction because of
expert testimony that the hospital's failure to clean the drill properly was not
foreseeable. Id. at 1316-17. However, "[blecause a single instance of improper
cleaning could cause the drill to malfunction and numerous instances of
improper cleaning in various hospitals were known [by the manufacturer], ...
[t]here was no evidence to support the product misuse instruction." id. at
1317; see also American Laundry Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 412 A.2d 407 (Md.
1980) (manufacturer of an institutional clothes dryer held liable for injuries
sustained when the dryer disintegrated while being used to dry a large hot air
balloon); Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 332 A.2d 11, 21 (Md. 1975) (court held
that reasonably foreseeable use of cologne and liability of manufacturer were
questions for the jury).
65. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). Plaintiff, who was badly injured in an
accident where the driver of a truck lost control when the butterfly valves of a
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manufacturer of a knife designed to cut meat could not be liable
if the plaintiff misused the knife by using it as a toothpick. 66 But
what about a plaintiff who is cut when the blade of the knife
breaks, because of a defect in manufacturing, while the plaintiff
is using the knife to scrape meat from the bottom of a pan? Or a
second example, from Ellsworth, citing an article by Mr. Vargo,
to the effect that "a high speed electric drill may be defective
because a manufacturing defect causes it to short circuit and
produce a shock during normal usage," 67 but "[a] plaintiff who
attaches a brush to that drill and in attempting to clean his teeth
suffers injury to his mouth from the high speed of the brush will
lose ... *"68 his case because of his misuse of the drill. But
what about the plaintiff who is injured because he uses the drill
while standing in water? It seems that in these close cases - those
involving a knife used to scrape or a drill used near water - a
trier of fact must decide if misuse is present. In these cases, who
bears the burden of proof could make a great deal of difference
indeed.
Statistically, of the thirty-one states that to date have addressed
the issue of burden of proof with any kind of specificity or
certainty, 69 twenty states view misuse as a defense and place the

burden on the defendant, 70 while the other eleven states view "no
defective carburetor were locked in an open position, brought a products
liability action against the defendant manufacturer. The court held that:

[I]f the product is found to have been unreasonably dangerous when the
defendant placed it in the stream of commerce, and if that defect is
found to have been a producing cause of the damaging event, and if the
plaintiff has misused the product in the sense, as defined by the trial
court in its charge. . . and if that misuse is a proximate cause of the
damaging event, the trier of fact must then determine the respective
percentages ... by which these two concurring causes contributed to
bring about the event.
Id. at 352.
66. Id. at 349. See also Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1545.
67. Ellsworth, 495 A.2d at 356. See also Vargo, supra note 11, at 459.
68. Ellsworth, 495 A.2d at 356.
69. See infra notes 70-71; AMIIUCAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§§ 42:1, 2 (1987).
70. The courts in the following cases have held or recognized that the
defendant bears the burden of proving misuse, either by expressly stating that
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view or by characterizing misuse as an affirmative defense in which the
defendant ordinarily bears the burden: Banner Welders, Inc. v. Knighton, 425
So. 2d 441 (Ala. 1982) (holding that user's misuse constituted a valid defense
under the "extended manufacturer's liability doctrine where plaintiff sustained
injuries while operating a shuttle welder); Butaud v. Suburban Marine &
Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976) (holding the defense of
comparative negligence extends to misuse in strict liability where plaintiff
sustained injuries while riding a snowmobile); Daly v. General Motors Corp.,
575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978) (holding misuse is a defense to strict liability where
plaintiff sustained injuries when he was ejected from his car during a
collision); Nelson v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 694 P.2d 867 (Colo. Ct. App.
1984) (holding that misuse which could not reasonably be anticipated is a valid
defense where plaintiff was injured while operating a forklift); Matthews v.
F.M.C. Corp., 462 A.2d 376 (Conn. 1983) (holding the special defense of
misuse is available in strict liability where plaintiff sustained injuries as a
result of his hand becoming caught in a sandwich machine); West v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976) (holding that defense of
misuse is adopted as stated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A where
plaintiff was run over by a backward moving soil grader); McBride v. Ford
Motor Co., 673 P.2d 55 (Idaho 1983) (holding misuse is an affirmative
defense to a strict liability action where plaintiff sustained injury while
operating a branch chipping machine); Wells v. Coulter Sales, Inc., 306
N.W.2d 411 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that misuse is a proper defense
to a strict liability action where plaintiff was killed while operating a forklift);
Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 283 N.W.2d 25 (Neb. 1979) (holding misuse is a
valid defense to a strict liability action where plaintiff was injured as a result
of his tractor colliding with the median in the road); Thibault v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978) (holding product misuse is an
affirmative defense to strict liability where plaintiff was injured as a result of
his foot becoming caught under a power mower); Marchese v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 670 P.2d 113 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (holding
defendant must raise defenses of contributory negligence and misuse of the
product where plaintiff was killed as a result of driving in the wrong direction
at the Malibu Grand Prix race track); Sheppard v. Charles A. Smith Well
Drilling & Water Sys., 93 A.D.2d 474, 463 N.Y.S.2d 546 (3d Dep't 1983)
(holding the defense of misuse is adopted as stated in Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A where plaintiff was injured as a result of a hoist device
snapping); Davis v. Cincinnati, Inc., 610 N.E.2d 496 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)
(holding misuse is an affirmative defense to be asserted by defendant
manufacturer where plaintiff was injured while using a press brake); Messier
v. Simmons Gun Specialties, Inc., 687 P.2d 121 (Okla. 1984) (holding misuse
is affirmative defense to be asserted by manufacturer where plaintiff was killed
as a result of a gun exploding); Allen v. Heil Co., 589 P.2d 1120 (Or. 1979)
(holding misuse of a product is an affirmative defense where plaintiff was
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misuse" as part of the plaintiffs prima facie case and place the
burden on the plaintiff.7 1 While there may have been a trend in
injured as a result of a dryer exploding); Norman v. Fisher Marine, Inc., 672
S.W.2d 414 (Tenn. CL App. 1984) (holding misuse is an affirmative defense
where plaintiff was killed as a result of being thrown from a fishing boat);
General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977) (holding
misuse is a defense in product liability actions where plaintiff was injured as a
result of an explosion of the carburetor in his car); Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand
Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981) (holding misuse is an affirmative defense to
strict liability that should be applied according to comparative principles where
plaintiff was injured as a result of standing on a mining winch); Smith v.
Sturm, Ruger & Co., 695 P.2d 600 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (holding misuse is
an affirmative defense); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297
S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982) (holding misuse and comparative negligence are
affirmative defenses in strict liability where plaintiff's property was damaged
as a result of faulty wiring from a clock).
71. The courts in the following cases have either, explicitly or implicitly,
held or recognized that the misuse defense in strict products liability cases is
not an affirmative defense in which the defendant bears the burden of proof:
Lewis v. Rego Co., 757 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1985) (using Pennsylvania law to
hold misuse is not a separate defense but is related to issues of defectiveness
and proximate cause in plaintiff's case where plaintiff suffered severe injuries
as a result of an explosion of a propane cylinder); Trust Corp. of Montana v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Mont. 1981) (applying Montana
law to determine conduct by the plaintiff which could be termed misuse shall
be used only to compare fault and reduce damages and not as an affirmative
defense where plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of an airplane crash);
Amburgey v. Holan Div., 606 P.2d 21 (Ariz. 1980) (holding that for a
plaintiff to prove that a product was defective he must show that it was being
used for its intended use where plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of an
electric current coming into contact with the bucket attached to his boom
crane); Gallee v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 374 N.E.2d 831 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)
(holding that plaintiff bears the burden of showing that he used the product in
a normal and customary manner which was reasonably foreseeable by the
defendants where plaintiff sustained injuries as a result of falling from a
ladder); Hughes v. Magic Chef, Inc., 288 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1980) (holding
that misuse of a product is an element of plaintiff's own case and not an
affirmative defense where plaintiff was severely burned when his stove
exploded); Ellsworth v. Sheme Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348 (Md. 1985)
(holding misuse is related to proximate cause of plaintiff's injury and plaintiff
has the burden of proving proximate cause where plaintiff was injured as a
result of her fire resistant nightgown catching on fire); Busch v. Busch
Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977) (holding that plaintiff's conduct
which can be labeled misuse is not a defense but is part of plaintiff's case
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the early 1980's toward treating misuse as part of the prima facie
case, the most recent cases and statutes have come down squarely
on the side of treating misuse as an affirmative defense. 7 2 Thus,

by an approximate majority of two to one, jurisdictions still treat
misuse as an affirmative defense, with the corresponding burden
of proof being born by the defendant.
Given all of the foregoing, the question now becomes what
approach should the Restatement take on the issue of plaintiff
misuse? To me, the answer is clear; the Restatement (Third) of

Torts should, in the appropriate comment, unambiguously state
that a majority of jurisdictions place the burden of establishing
plaintiff misuse on the defendant. This language could take the

format of the proposal for comments e, f, and n recently
proffered by Professors Henderson and Twerski. 73 The format
where plaintiff sustained injury as a result of a defect in the plastic yoke of a
turn-signal switch); Early-Gary, Inc. v. Walters, 294 So. 2d 181 (Miss. 1974)
(holding misuse is related to proximate cause and plaintiff has the burden of
proving proximate cause where plaintiff was injured upon opening a ketchup
bottle); Rogers v. Toro Mfg. Co., 522 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)
(holding misuse is not a defense to a strict liability but an element of plaintiff's
cause of action where plaintiff sustained injury when he was struck by a lawn
mower); Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Serv., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D.
1984) (holding plaintiff must prove that his misuse is not the proximate cause
of injuries where plaintiff was injured as a result of a nylon rope breaking);
Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816 (N.J. 1978) (holding
plaintiff must prove his conduct was not the proximate cause of his injury
where plaintiff was injured by a "palletizing" machine).
72. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text; Henderson & Twerski,
supra note 1, at 1546.
73. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1518-19, 1525. Professors
Henderson and Twerski's proposals for comments e, f, and n in pertinent parts
are as follows: Comment e states that "[t]he rule stated in this section sets
forth the traditional causation rule as the governing standard. This comment
recognizes that digressions from the rules may be called for in unusual
circumstances. However, when plaintiff identification is possible, courts
should be reluctant to abandon traditional causation principles." id. at 1518.
Comment f states:
The rule stated in this section applies to anyone in the business of
selling the type of product that injured the plaintiff. The seller's
business need not be limited to the sale of such products. However, this
rule does not cover occasional sales outside the regular course of
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followed in these proposed comments is particularly relevant
because they deal with other issues over which the courts are also
divided. 74 Applying this format to the issue of plaintiff misuse
may produce language that reads as follows: "A majority of
courts (or jurisdictions) take the position that the burden of
plaintiff misuse falls on the defendant. Pursuant to this view,
misuse is treated as an affirmative defense that may relieve the
defendant of liability, but is not part of the plaintiff's prima facie
case. A minority of courts (or jurisdictions) place the burden of
proving that the product was not misused on the plaintiff.
Pursuant to this view, misuse is treated as a causal component,
which is traditionally part of the plaintiff's prima facie case."
Along with being a complete, accurate, and straightforward
statement of the current state of the law on the misuse issue, this
language has several other advantages. First, it avoids putting the
Restatement in the awkward position of not taking a position.
While there are many open issues regarding products liability,
misuse is not among them. The issue may have been open in
1963, 75 but since then two distinct views have emerged, and each
76
can be clearly articulated.
Second, the language avoids labeling a significant body of case
law as immature or undeveloped. Specifically, the Restatement
should not suggest that once courts realize that a misuse analysis
really amounts to nothing more than a proximate cause analysis,
the opposing point of view will disappear. 77 While we all may be
convinced of the correctness of our sometimes diametrically
business (frequently referred to as "casual sales"). Thus, a manufacturer
who occasionally sells supplies or used equipment does not fall within
the ambit of this rule.

Id. Comment n states in part that "[tihe rule stated in this section accepts the
majority view allowing comparative fault to operate as a partial or total
defense to a products liability claim depending on the general comparative
fault rules in a given jurisdiction." Id. at 1525.
74. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1525.
75. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1527-28 n. 10 (listing some
of the unresolved or unforeseen issues when § 402A was drafted in 1963).
76. See supra notes 70-71; Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 151819, 1525, 1546.
77. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1546.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1993

23

Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1993], Art. 10

206

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 10

opposed views, the Restatement in particular does not have the
luxury of minimizing significant lines of legal thought.
Finally, the language is consistent with the treatment of
comparative fault, the issue to which this discussion now turns.
COMPARATIVE FAULT
Perhaps more than any other concept relevant to section 402A,
the concept of comparative fault has the potential to permanently
and profoundly alter products liability law. When all is said and
done, comparative fault may be the basis for all future products
liability causes of action. 78
Comparative fault is, essentially, the application of principles
of comparative negligence to causes of action grounded in other
theories of fault. Some courts have refused to acknowledge the
doctrine, holding that comparative negligence principles simply
do not apply beyond causes of action based in negligence. 79
Other courts have apportioned fault among the parties regardless
of whether fault lay in negligence or another theory of liability,
hence the more general doctrine of comparative fault. 80 This
general pattern of development has been replicated in the area of
78. See, e.g., VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, § 1.1,
at 1 (1st ed. 1974); Vargo, supra note 11, at 460-62 (discussing the
application of comparative fault principles in strict liability cases).
79. See, e.g., Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795, 802 (8th Cir.
1976) (observing that the application of a comparative negligence statute in a
strict liability case would be "extremely confusing and inappropriate"); Kinard
v. Coats Co., 553 P.2d 835, 837 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (refusing to extend
the application of comparative negligence principles to products liability
actions under § 402A because such actions are not based upon negligence
principles).
80. See, e.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Cal.
1978) (extending comparative negligence principles to strict liability actions
and recognizing the broad applicability of comparative fault in both negligence
and strict liability); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 92 (Fla.
1976) (holding that "comparative negligence is a defense in a strict liability
action..." and may be a defense in an implied warranty action).
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strict products liability. Some courts have refused to apply the
doctrine of comparative fault in strict products liability causes of
action. 8 1 These courts point to the theoretical problem of
comparing a user's fault with a manufacturer's no-fault liability,
the practical problem of comparing a plaintiff's conduct to a
product's defect, and the policy problem of reducing the
incentive of the manufacturer to produce safer products. 82 Most
courts, however, perhaps attracted by what Prosser has called
"the facile simplicity of the doctrine," 83 have applied
comparative fault in strict products liability cases. 84
If the principles of comparative fault are applied to their fullest
in the area of strict products liability, the net effect may be
neutral. Such application would suggest that, to the benefit of the
defendant-manufacturer, the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff-user should operate to reduce the plaintiff's recovery, 85
and to the benefit of the plaintiff-user, his assumption of risk
should not completely bar recovery from the defendantmanufacturer. 86

81. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 78, § 1.5(B), at 18-19 (discussing
courts which have resisted judicial adoption of doctrine of comparative fault).
82. ld.
83. See Richard N. Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under Comparative
Fault Laws-An Analysis of the Alternatives, 40 LA. L. REv. 343, 372 (1980)
("[What is a relatively simple idea involves a great deal of complexity in
translating that concept into a concrete plan for loss apportionment.").
84. See 1A Louis R. FRUMER & MELvIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCrS
LIABILrrY § 3.01(5)(i) (1991) ("In recent years there has been widespread
adoption of comparative negligence, either judicially or by statutes, either
expressly adopting comparative fault in products liability cases or in statutes
construed to include products liability actions.").
85. See Zavala v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 178 Cal. Rptr. 185, 186-87
(Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that an intoxicated plaintiff is still entitled to
partial recovery even though he is 80% at fault and guilty of willful
misconduct); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 887 (%V.
Va. 1979) (holding that a plaintiff's contributory negligence does not bar but
merely reduces his recovery unless the plaintiff is "substantially negligent").
86. See Bradley, 256 S.E.2d at 885-86.
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The same is true with respect to the more specific issue of
plaintiff misuse. 87 In some instances, comparative fault may
reduce recovery even in cases where the plaintiff's misuse was
foreseeable, but in other instances may allow recovery in cases
where the misuse was not foreseeable. 88 The courts are still
struggling with the scope of the doctrine of comparative fault as
it applies to the general and specific issues of strict products
liability. 89
For its part, comment n of the proposed section restates both
the majority and minority views and concludes by accepting the
majority view, which "allow[s] comparative fault to operate as a
partial or total defense to a products liability claim depending on
the general comparative fault rules in a given jurisdiction."90 The
comment takes no position on the specific issues of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk in this context. 9 1
As written, comment n seems appropriately drafted so as to be
included in the Restatement. While some may prefer that the
majority view not be adopted because it presents an opportunity
to reduce recovery in cases of simple contributory negligence, it
is, nonetheless, the majority view.
Furthermore, comment n also sheds some final light on the
appropriate burden of proof regarding plaintiff misuse. Indeed,
comment o of the proposed section suggests that the effects of
plaintiff misuse "will ordinarily be determined by the rules of
comparative fault set forth [in comment n]." 92 If this is true,
comments n and o provide the final two arguments for placing
the burden of plaintiff misuse on the defendant. First, with
87. See General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 352 (Tex.
1977) (holding that plaintiff's misuse acts to reduce his recovery).
88. See, e.g., id. at 351; see also Harville v. Anchor-Wate Co., 663 F.2d
598, 602-03 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that misuse will "reduce plaintiff's
recovery by the percentage that his misuse contributed to the injury .... ").
89. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978)
(altering burden of proof as to risk-utility balancing on grounds of strict
liability); Jacobs v. Technical Chem. Co., 472 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Civ. App.
1971) (altering traditional causation rules on grounds of strict liability).
90. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1525.
91. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1525.
92. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1525-26.
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respect to format, it is inconsistent to accept the majority view
regarding comparative fault in comment n, and not accept it
regarding plaintiff misuse in comment o. Second, with respect to
substance, if comment o urges that misuse be treated as
comparative fault, and comment n treats comparative fault as a
"partial or total defense," 93 the inescapable conclusion is that
misuse standing alone must be treated as a defense, and not as an
element of the plaintiff's prima facie case.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I believe that it is important for the Restatement,
in comment o or elsewhere, to stress the majority view regarding
plaintiff misuse, i.e., that misuse is an affirmative defense. While
perhaps considered a minor or even inconsequential point by
some, taking this position achieves three major results. First, it
helps distinguish strict products liability claims from those that
arise in negligence. Second, it is consistent with the treatment of
the ever increasingly important doctrine of comparative fault.
And finally, it remains true to the ultimate goal of section 402Arestating the law on products liability.

93. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 1, at 1525-26; see also KEETON
Er AL., supra note 26, § 67.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1993

27

Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1993], Art. 10

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss1/10

28

